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1Effect of Immigration on Demographic Structure
Abstract: 
Immigration has a substantial influence on the size and growth of the population and the labour
force, with also considerable influence on the socio-cultural composition, as seen through
ethnicity, language and visible minority status. Given the uneven distribution of immigrants over
regions, and their subsequent re-migration patterns, immigration accentuates the growth of the
largest cities. Immigration enhances the educational profile of the population, but controlling
for age, immigrants now have lower proportions in the labour force, lower average income and
higher proportions with low income status. 
Demography is defined as the study of population states and processes. The states refer to size,
distribution over space, and composition of the population. The processes are fertility, mortality,
migration, and other changes in state. The main purpose here is to study how immigration affects
demographic structure in terms of the size, distribution and composition of the population. Size
may be further affected by the relative fertility and mortality of immigrants. Distribution is
affected by the initial place of arrival, and by the internal migration of immigrants. The factors of
composition that are considered are age, ethnicity, language, education, labour force status, and
income. For the most part, the analyses are based on past trends, but projections are also useful
when considering population size, age structure and labour force. The paper will end with some
thoughts that seek to put migration in an interpretive context.
Population size and growth
The impact of immigration on past population size and growth can be examined from three
different perspectives:  the direct impact of migration on population growth, the impact of
children born to immigrants, the proportion of people in Canada who are foreign born.
Annual population estimates provide a summary measure of the direct impact of
immigration on population growth.  This measure includes only arrivals and departures, or the
first generation of immigrants.  Over the century 1901 to 2001, the total immigration of some
12.8 million persons and emigration of some 6.1 million produced a net gain of 6.7 million,
representing a quarter of the population growth over the period (Table 1).  The contribution of
net international migration to population growth has varied considerably over history, reaching a
peak in the 1901-11 decade when it accounted for 44.1 percent. Over the period 1951-91, net
migration accounted for 25 percent of population growth. However, the 1991-2001 period shows
close to 60 percent of population growth is due to net migration. On an annual basis, since 1994,
net migration has comprised a larger proportion of total population growth than natural increase
(Bélanger, 2002: 10).
As natural increase slows down, and especially after it becomes negative, the measures of
the contribution of net immigration to population growth lose some of their intuitive value.
Rather than comparing natural increase and net migration, it may be best to compare immigrants
and births as additions to the population. For instance, over the period 1991-2001, immigration
2accounted for 59.7 percent of population growth, but the average annual immigration was
220,900, while average births were 367,900, that is immigrants amounted to 38 percent of the
total additions to the population.
It should also be noted that we are not counting here the temporary residents, that is
persons who have a student or work visa to stay in Canada for a limited period, and persons
seeking refugee status whose cases have not been determined by the courts. Estimating those
who are in Canada for at least one year, the number of non-permanent residents increased from
about 85,000 in 1982 to 225,000 in 1990, and 288,000 in 2001 (Michalowski, 1993: 64;
Statistics Canada, 2002b: 74). Their numbers are therefore slightly higher than one year’s
immigration.
Table 1. Immigration, Emigration, and Contribution to Population Growth, Canada, 1851-2001 
Population
(at end of
period)
Immigration Average
immigration(% of
population)
Emigration Contribution
to
population
growth
1851
1851-61
1861-71
1871-81
1881-91
1891-1901
1901-11
1911-21
1921-31
1931-41
1941-51
1951-61
1961-71
1971-81
1981-91
1991-2001
2,523,000
3,230,000
3,689,000
4,325,000
4,833,000
5,371,000
7,207,000
8,788,000
10,376,700
11,506,700
14,009,400
18,238,200
21,962,082
24,820,382
28,030,864
31,081,887
352,000
260,000
350,000
680,000
250,000
1,550,000
1,400,000
1,200,000
149,000
548,000
1,543,000
1,429,000
1,429,000
1,381,000
2,229,125
1.22 %
0.75 %
0.87 %
1.49 %
0.49 %
2.46 %
1.75 %
1.25 %
0.14 %
0.43 %
0.96 %
0.71 %
0.61 %
0.52 %
0.75%
170,000
410,000
404,000
826,000
380,000
740,000
1,089,000
970,000
241,000
379,000
463,000
707,000
636,000
490,000
407,180
23.0%
-32.6%
- 8.5%
-28.7%
-24.2%
44.1%
19.7%
14.5%
- 8.1%
7.9%
25.5%
21.7%
28.6%
27.7%
59.7%
Sources: Beaujot and Rappak, 1988: 27; Statistics Canada, Annual Demographic Statistics,
1999: 20,188,191, 249; Statistics Canada, Annual Demographic Statistics, 2001: 18-19 
The direct impact of immigration and emigration can also be appreciated through a
comparison to the base population. In particular, it is useful to compute the average annual levels
per 100 people in the Canadian population (Table 1). In the period around the turn of the century
there was an average of 2.46 annual arrivals per 100 population. The period of the 1950s had
levels very close to one percent of the receiving population. Decades since 1971 have seen
annual arrivals in the order of 0.52 to 0.75 percent of base population, and departures in the order
of 0.13 to 0.27 percent of the base population. The averages for the period 1971-2001 show
immigration amounting to 0.63 percent of base population, and emigration amounting to 0.20
3percent, for a net migration of 0.43 percent of base population.
The second approach for estimating the demographic impact of immigration includes the
impact of births to immigrants on population growth. Applying birth and death rates observed
over the 1951-81 period to the 1951 population, the population would have changed from 14.0
million in 1951 to 20.4 million in 1981 (Le Bras, 1988:9). Since the 1981 population was 24.3
million, this implies that 38 percent of the actual growth was a function of immigration and
births to these immigrants over the period 1951-81.
Adopting the same method of using past vital rates to determine the population size
without international migration, Duchesne (1993) reports the surprising finding that over the
period 1871-1991 there is very little difference in ultimate population size with or without
migration.  This is because it took a long time to compensate for the departures toward the
United States of the period 1871-1895.  Using the “counter-factual” scenario of no international
migration over the period 1951-2001, Denton et al. (2001) arrive at a 2001 population of 22.2
million. This implies that 51.5 percent of the growth from 14.0 million to 31.1 million, over the
period 1951-2001, was due to the direct plus indirect effect of international migration.
The indirect impact of immigration is affected by the relative vital rages of the foreign-
born and Canadian-born populations. Various analyses conclude that the foreign born have a
slight advantage in health and mortality (e.g. Chen et al., 1996; Trovato, 1996; Choinière, 1993).
This advantage appears to decline over time, pointing to selection factors. Immigrant fertility
was lower than the Canadian average in the past, but  above that average in the 1991 census
(Maxim, 1996; Beaujot, 1997; Bélanger and Dumas, 1998).  At the 1961 and 1971 censuses, in
each age group, the foreign born had a lower number of children ever born than the Canadian-
born population (Ram and George, 1990).  In 1981, this pattern applied to age groups 30 and
over.  In 1991 the foreign born at age groups 30-44 had higher fertility but the differences remain
minor. The study of fertility differentials show that persons born in other than Canada, Europe
and North America have a higher probability of having a third child (Bélanger, and Dumas,
1998: 57). 
The third approach to studying the impact of immigration on the population is to consider
the proportion foreign born in the census data (e.g. Badets and Chui, 1994).  This figure has
increased slowly from 15 to 18 percent over the censuses from 1951 to 1996.  The second
generation, that is persons whose parents are foreign born, have not been captured in the
censuses since 1971.  That census found that 33.8 percent of persons were either foreign born or
had at least one foreign born parent (Kalbach and McVey, 1979: 179).  Using data on births and
deaths, Edmonston (1996) calculates that over the period 1951-91 about 35 percent of the
Canadian population has been first or second generation, while about half have been in the first
three generations.  The 2001 census will enable us to update these figures on second generation,
since the "birthplace of parents" question was included. 
Immigration and future population growth
In the projections based on the 1996 census, the medium fertility assumption of 1.48
births per woman, with zero international migration produces a population that reaches a peak of
31.5 million in 2018, then begins to decline (Loh and George, 2001). In the medium projection
used in the Statistics Canada (2001a) projections, that is fertility of 1.48, immigration of 225,000
4per year, emigration of 66,000 per year, and life expectancy reaching 82, the population reaches
a peak of 37.1 million in 2040, before beginning a slow decline to 36.9 million in 2051. That is,
compared to zero immigration, an immigration of 225,000 delays population decline by 22 years,
and produces a 2040 population that is 27 percent higher.
Table 2 sets out the assumptions that have been used in Statistics Canada population
projections following the various censuses. The low assumption following the 1996 census uses
a fertility of 1.3 and an immigration of 180,000, while the high assumptions is based on a
fertility of 1.8 and immigration of 270,000. Natural increase becomes negative by 2016 in the
low projection, 2026 in the medium projection, and 2036 in the high projection. Population
decline starts after 2030 in the low projection, after 2040 in the medium projection, and there is
continued growth in the high projection.
Table 2. Assumptions Underlying Statistics Canada Projections from 1971 to 1996 Censuses
Total fertility
rate
              Immigration          Life
expectancy M/F
Projection L M H L M H H M L
1971 census 1.8 2.2 2.6 120,000 … 160,000 70.2/
78.3
1976 census 1.7 … 2.1 125,000 150,000 175,000 70.2/
78.3
1981 census 1.4 1.66 2.2 100,000 … 150,000 74.9/
81.6
1986 census 1.2 1.67 2.1 140,000 … 200,000 77.2/
84.0
1991 census 1.5 1.7 1.9 150,000 250,000 330,000 81.0/
86.0
78.5/
84.0
77.0/
83.0
1996 census 1.3 1.48 1.8 180,000 225,000 270,000 81.5/
85.0
80.0/
84.0
78.5/
83.0
 
Source: 
1. Statistics Canada, 1974: 26, 59; 1979: 21, 29; 1985: 27, 41; 1990: 12, 26; 1994: 59; 2001:
57
2. Statistics Canada, Demography Division, special tabulations
Without reviewing all other projections here, it is worth observing that in the 18th
Actuarial Report on the Canada Pension Plan, the fertility rate is set at 1.64, life expectancy at 81
by 2025, and net migration of 0.50 percent of population (Office of the Chief Actuary, 2001: 14,
18). With these assumptions, the population of Canada less Quebec is still growing in 2050,
having increased 38.8 percent since 2001.
In their projections to 2046, Denton et al. (2000) use medium assumptions of 1.55 for
fertility, 225,000 for immigration, 0.19 for emigration and life expectancy of 82.9 in 2046. These
assumptions show continued growth through the projection period, bringing the 2046 population
to 37.7 million, or a growth of 21.5 percent since 2001.  
5Unless fertility were to return to higher levels, immigration will likely continue to be
more important than natural increase, and population growth will be slower than it has been in
the past, with prospects for decline under low assumptions. For instance, over the period 1951-
2001 the population of Canada more than doubled, while the high, medium and low projections
based on the 1996 census anticipate a total growth of 39.7, 19.0 and 4.2, percent respectively
over the period 2001-2051 (Statistics Canada, 2001a: 61). The impact of immigration will
clearly become larger as natural increase declines and eventually becomes negative.
Nonetheless, in the medium projection, after natural increase becomes negative and all of the
growth is due to immigration, births still comprise 59.3 percent of the additions to the population
(births plus immigrants) in the period 2025-2030 (Statistics Canada, 2001a: 118).
Following a United Nations (2000) study, the concept of replacement migration is useful
for summarizing the impact of immigration on future population. That is, how could migration
bring forms of replacement that would keep the population more similar to what it has been in
the past. The first definition of replacement migration is the number of immigrants necessary to
avoid long term population decline, in the context of below replacement fertility. Ryder (1997)
uses the concept of replacement migration in the sense of the level of migration that would
achieve the same ultimate population size as we would achieve if fertility were at replacement
levels. Using the vital rates of the early 1990s, Ryder places the replacement net migration figure
at 167,225, which might be translated into an immigration of 215,000. With a continuation of
recent levels of fertility, the projections that we have reviewed suggest than an annual
immigration slightly above 225,000 per year would prevent population decline in the foreseeable
future. 
Age structure
The impact of immigration on the age structure can be appreciated by comparing the median age
of immigrants at arrival to that of the Canadian population.  The median age of immigrants was
relatively stable, averaging 25 years for each year between 1956 and 1976, then increasing to 27
years in 1981-86, 28 years in 1986-90 and 30 years in 1994-99 (Beaujot et al., 1989; Beaujot and
Hou, 1993; Citizenship and Immigration, 1997b: 40; Citizenship and Immigration, 1999: 40;
Bélanger, 2001: 53).  The median age of the entire Canadian population has changed much more,
increasing from 26.3 in 1961 to 37.6 in 2001.  In effect, the median age of arriving immigrants
was about one to two years younger than that of the receiving population in 1961, compared to
seven to eight years younger by 2000.  Both immigrant arrivals and the receiving population
have been aging, but arrivals remain younger on average.  However, the overall impact is rather
small given that immigrant arrivals represent a small part of the total population.  Clearly, other
demographic phenomenon, including the movement of the baby boom through the age structure,
lower fertility, and mortality reductions at older ages, have a larger impact on the age structure
than the arrival of immigrants.  
Other measures confirm that immigration has a rather small impact on the age structure.
For instance, simulating population change as a function only of births and deaths after 1951
produces a 1981 population with an average age that is only 0.5 years older than the actual
average observed in that year. Stated differently, the 1951-81 immigration would have reduced
the average age of the 1981 population by a half year (Le Bras, 1988:12). As another example,
6with zero international migration over the period 1951 to 2001, the median age in 2001 is only
0.8 years older than the actual figure for that year (Denton et al., 2001).
Similar results are obtained with projections into the future. The Statistics Canada (1990)
population projections based on the 1986 census produce a median age in 2036 that is almost
two years younger under high immigration than under zero immigration. This means that the
arrival of 200,000 immigrants per year for 50 years would have only reduced the average age by
two years. In comparison, the median age of the Canadian population increased by 2.3 years
between 1996 and 2001.
Other analyses confirm that immigration slightly reduces the average age. For instance,
Li and Wu (2001) obtain the result that as long as the fertility of the foreign born is higher than
34 percent of that of the Canadian-born, immigration would have a slowing effect on aging.
The projections based on the 1996 census indicate that the proportion 65 and over
reaches 25.4 percent in 2051 with an immigration of 225,000 per year, compared to 29.8 percent
with zero international migration, and a 2001 figure of 13.0 percent (Loh and George, 2001).
Denton et al. (2001) show the effects of three immigration assumptions to 2051: (1) the standard
case with immigration of 225,000, (2) immigration 50 percent higher, and (3) double the
standard case. The median age in 2051 is 46.5 in the standard case, 45.1 with immigration 50
percent higher, and 44.2 with immigration of 450,000 per year. Thus an extra 225,000
immigrants per year for 50 years reduces the median age by 2.3 years, and reduces the percent
aged 65 and over by 3.0 percentage points (from 25.9 to 22.9 percent). 
Using the assumptions underlying the projections from the 1991 census, George et al.
(1997) compare the impact of the various alternative fertility, mortality and immigration
assumptions on various parts of the population. For the total population, the alternative
immigration assumptions have the largest impact for the first 40 years, but after that a difference
of 0.4 between high and low fertility has a greater impact than a difference of 180,000
immigrants. Clearly, the alternate fertility assumptions have the largest impact on the growth of
the population aged 0-14. For the growth of the population aged 65 and over, alternate life
expectancies have the largest impact, and fertility has no impact over the projection period. For
the population aged 15-64, the alternate immigration assumptions have the largest impact, and
the mortality assumptions have the lowest impact.
An alternative definition of the United Nations (2000) concept of replacement migration
seeks to maintain the relative size of the population aged 15-64 to that aged 65 and over. As
recognized by the authors of the report, this scenario leads to absurd results, sometimes assuming
that the whole world move to one country to prevent an increase in the proportion aged 65+
compared to that aged 15-64 (Coleman, 2000). This is the strong sense of “replacement
migration,” with migrants eventually replacing the original population (Lachapelle, 2001). As
indicated by various projections, including those from Denton et al. (1997), there is not a
demographic solution to aging. 
It is probably for the study of aging that population projections play their most useful
role. Table 3 gathers data on the ratio of population aged 20-64 to the population aged 65 and
over. In 1951, this ratio was close to seven persons of working ages per person at retirement
ages, it has declined to under five, and will be about 2.5 in 2050. Even an immigration of
500,000 per year brings the ratio to 2.7 in 2036. 
7Table 3. Ratio of population aged 20-64 to population aged 65+, Canada, 1950-2100
Historical data
      1951
      1976
      2001
6.97
6.49
4.86
Statistics Canada medium projection (from 1971 census)
       2001 5.35
Statistics Canada projections in 2001 2026 2051
     Low (Projection 1) 3.04 2.42
     Medium (Projection 2) 3.04 2.45
     High (Projection 3) 3.05 2.51
Projected in CPP for (year) 2000 2050 2100
     Report 0 (1964) 6.22 5.61
     Report 6 (1977) 5.62 3.47
     Report 12 (1988) 4.83 2.48 2.32
     Report 17 (1999) 4.92 2.39 2.17
     Report 18 (2000) 4.90 2.36 2.23*
Projected with alternate immigration levels (year) 2016 2036
     Zero immigration 3.36 1.79
     100,000 3.54 2.02
     200,000 3.70 2.22
     300,000 3.86 2.40
     400,000 4.00 2.59
     500,000 4.15 2.70
Note: * in 2075
Source: 
1. Statistics Canada, 2001: 183 -- 185; Denton et al., 1997: 39, 41
2. Office of the Chief Actuary, 2001: 18
Labour force
In “One hundred years of labour force,” Crompton and Vickers (2000) show that the
periods of  most rapid labour force growth were those of high immigration, especially the
decades of 1901-1911 and 1951-1961. In addition, the period 1955-1990 experienced an increase
in women’s labour force participation, from 20 percent of women aged 25 and over working,  to
a level of 56 percent in 1990. Consequently, the labour force grew rapidly in the post-war era
(Figure 1). The period 1966-86 included the entry of the baby boom into labour force ages, the
rising participation of women, and the substantial level of immigration. The rate of growth of
this period was unmatched by any other western industrialized economy (Foot, 1987). 
8Figure 1. Growth of population aged 20-64, 1951-2051
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Source: Statistics Canada. 1987. “Population and Dwelling Characteristics: Are, Sex and Marital
Status”. Catalogue no. 93-101: 3-1, 3-2; Census of Canada, 1991. Basic Summary Tabulation
E9101: Population by Single Years of Age, Showing Sex; Statistics Canada. “Annual
Demographic Statistics, 2001”. CD-ROM. Catalogue no. 91-213: 46; Statistics Canada. 1973.
“1971 Census of Canada: Population: Age Groups”. Catalogue no. 92-715: 7-1, 7-2; Statistics
Canada, “Population Projections, 2000-2026”, Catalogue No. 91-520: 149, 151, 169, 171, 183,
185.
Both for growth and for aging, the trends in the labour force and in the whole population
have been rather different. While the rate of growth of the entire population had been slowing
down since 1951-56, the labour force population continued to grow rapidly into the early 1980s.
In the period 1966 to 1981, the labour force was growing at close to 3 percent per year, while the
growth has been 1.2 percent per year in 1991-2001 (Statistics Canada, 2001b). For aging, while
the whole population had been aging for over a century, the average age of the labour force did
not increase until 1986 when the baby boom was completely at labour force ages.
In their “what if” scenario with no immigration since 1951, Denton et al. (2001) show
that the labour force would have been almost 30 percent smaller in 2001 if there had been no
migration. On the other hand, the median age of the labour force would only have been 0.4 years
older than its actual 2001 average age of 38.9 years.  
Turning to projections, the low assumptions from Statistics Canada (2001a) anticipates
that the population aged 18-64 would reach a peak of 21.9 million in 2016, then slowly decline
to 18.9 million in 2051. In the medium projection, this population increases by 11.5 percent
between 2001 and 2021, then declines by 4.0 percent to 2051. In the high projection, the total
growth over the period 2001-2051 is 22.0 percent. Thus in all scenarios labour force growth is
likely to be markedly slower than it has been in the past, and the low assumptions imply declines
9after 2016. However, the medium projection would anticipate only a very minor decline, and the
total in 2051 would be higher than that of 2001. In this medium projection, it is not
inconceivable that there would be no decline, if women’s participation continues to increase, and
if the participation for persons  ages 60 and over stops declining.  
It is also noteworthy that youth population, defined as ages 18-24, corresponding to
labour force entry, increases under all scenarios from 2001 to 2011, then declines in absolute
size under all scenarios at least for a ten year period (Statistics Canada, 2001a: 74). Another
useful comparison is between the population at ages 15-24 and 55-64, corresponding to typical
ages for labour force entry and exit. At the time of release of the age and sex profile from the
2001 census, many commentators spoke of an imminent labour shortage, and the Prime Minister
made a case for higher immigration. Yet, in 2001 there were 1.4 persons aged 15-24 for every
person aged 55-64. While the relative size of the persons at ages for labour force entry will
continue to decline, according to the medium projection this ratio will nonetheless be 1.2 in
2006. In 2011, when the leading edge of the baby boom will be in retirement ages, the ratio of
persons 15-24 to 55-64 will be 1.02, but the ratio will be 0.82 in 2031 when all of the baby boom
will be over 65 years of age. Thus, until 2011, the numbers of people at ages for labour force
entry will remains higher than those at ages for labour force exit, but in the more distant future
all scenarios show more people at ages for labour force exit than at ages for entry.
In their projections of population and labour force to 2046, Denton et al. (2000) show the
labour force starting to decline after 2016 under the medium assumptions (fertility at 1.55 and
immigration at 225,000). However, the decline to 2046 is only by 364,000 people, 2.1 percent
over 30 years, which could be made up with slight increases in participation. The low
assumptions, fertility at 1.25 and immigration at 175,000, show the labour force starting to
decline after 2011, with a decline of 12.7 percent over the next 35 years. Compared to an
immigration of 225,000, annual immigration that is 50% higher increases the size of the labour
force in 2051 by 18.5 percent, while double the immigration increases the size by 36.9 percent
(Denton et al., 2001). However, doubling the immigration level only reduces the median age of
the labour force in 2051 by 0.4 years compared to an average age of 40.9 years in the standard
case.
A third meaning of replacement migration would seek to use migration to maintain the
size of the labour force. If the objective is to prevent the labour force from declining, it is useful
to appreciate that there are other factors that can be manipulated. McDonald and Kippen (2001)
have outlined scenarios where, besides immigration, other factors are considered, in particular
the participation rate in the labour force (including ages at entry and departure, and women’s
participation) and the level of fertility. In their results for Canada, along with United States, New
Zealand, Australia and Singapore, decreases in labour supply can be avoided through
continuation of the present fertility, immigration and labour force participation rates. These
results are similar to those obtained by Denton and colleagues shown above, where the standard
assumptions shows very little labour force decline after 2016, that could be made up through
higher participation. Compared to the other sixteen countries studied by McDonald and Kippen
(2001), Canada and Australia are seen as having “moderate fertility, high immigration and low
labour force participation”. With current immigration, their results show the labour force rising
only slowly but not declining. Compared to this standard assumption, the current fertility and
labour force participation rates, but with zero immigration, would  bring declines in labour
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supply after about 2015. Increased labour force participation rates, moving men’s rates at ages
35+ toward their rates in 1970 and moving women’s rates at ages 25+ toward Swedish rates,
would lead to large increases in labour supply (25% increase from 2000 to 2030). A return to
fertility of 1.8 would bring growth of the labour force after 2025, compared to holding fertility
and migration constant.
The 2001 Annual Report to Parliament observes that 70% of labour force growth is due
to immigration (Citizenship and Immigration, 2001: 2). This figure is derived by looking at the
change in the size of the labour force between two censuses, used as a denominator, compared to
the number of labour force participants who had arrived in the previous five years. That is, of the
change in the size of the labour force, what percentage is due to immigration. When the labour
force is growing slowly, this figure is not very meaningful. For instance, if the labour force grew
from 10,000,000 to 10,000,001 but one member of the labour force was an immigrant of the past
five years, then 100% of the labour force growth would be due to the arrival of that one person.
It would seem more appropriate to look at the relative size of the internal and external sources of
entry into the labour force. The size of cohorts turning say 20 these days is about 408,000, while
immigration is about 210,000. Of course, neither group would be completely in the labour force.
If we estimate that 90% of those coming to labour force ages will be in the labour force at some
point, and that 90% of immigrants aged 15-64 will also be in the labour force, then we would
have 507,000 additions to the labour force, of which 72% would be due to internal recruitment
and only 28% due to immigration. 
That is, while immigration is an important source of recruitment to the labour force, some
have exaggerated this importance.  For instance, based on projections using zero immigration,
Baxter is quoted as saying that “if we didn’t have immigration, we’d stop regenerating our
labour force in about four years” (Hutchinson, 2002: 32). This implies that there is little
regeneration associated with the numbers of people leaving Canadian schools to enter the labour
force. It is absurd to say that our labour force will not be renewed unless we have immigration!
Clearly, immigration is an important source of recruitment, but there are other avenues.
Depending excessively on immigration can also undermine other sources of recruitment, both in
terms of appropriate educational investments and population groups that have lower labour force
participation. For instance, demographers in Sweden are convinced that, by avoiding the solution
of guest workers, the country was pushed to adopt family-friendly policies that encouraged
women’s participation (Hoem and Hoem, 1997).  
In the Canadian case, the average hours worked per week is 37.9 for employed men and
32.3 for women. Applied to the 45% female in the labour force, increasing women’s average
hours to that of men would be comparable to a 6.6% increase in the size of the labour force. At
ages 25 and over, the employment rate is 69.1 for men and 55.8 for women. Reducing that
difference by half would be equivalent to a 4.4% increase in the labour force. If the aim of
replacement migration is to prevent the labour force from declining, various means can be used,
including having a continued annual immigration of some 225,000 per year, with very slight
increases in participation.
Geographic distribution
Given its uneven distribution over space, immigration has an impact on the geographic
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distribution of Canada's population. As immigration becomes the principle component of
population change, there are increased regional inequalities in demographic growth. The
subsequent re-migration of the foreign-born population accentuates this regional inequality.
Rather than being a national phenomenon, immigration especially benefits population growth in
a limited number of provinces and metropolitan areas. 
Over the four decades 1956-96, the two provinces of Ontario and British Columbia have
consistently had a percentage of immigrant arrivals that exceeded their percentage of the
Canadian population (Denton et al., 1997: 42).  What is more, except for Manitoba and Alberta
in 1976-86, Ontario and British Columbia are the only provinces to have more immigrants than
their share of the population over the period 1956-96. 
The regional integration of immigrants follows especially on economic questions and the
links established between sending and receiving areas.  In their theoretical syntheses, Massey et
al. (1994) propose that globalization creates both migrant populations following on economic
displacements, and employment opportunities in large cities.  With efficient means of
communication, migratory exchanges are perpetuated between places of origin and destination. 
As a consequence, recent immigrants are concentrated in the large cities.
Considering five Canadian regions, in comparison to the Canadian-born population,
immigrants are more concentrated in Ontario and British Columbia, and less concentrated in the
Atlantic region and Quebec (Table 4).  For instance, in 1996 Quebec represented 27.1 percent of
the Canadian-born population but 13.4 percent of the foreign born.  In comparison, Ontario had
33.5 percent of the Canadian born but 54.8 percent of the foreign born.  Among Canadian born,
the largest province exceeds the second by 24 percent, but foreign born are four times as
numerous as in Quebec. 
The geographic impact is even more visible at the level of census metropolitan areas. 
While post-war immigration has largely been a metropolitan phenomenon, the Review of
Demography (1989) more correctly concluded that this has involved the metropolitan areas west
of the Quebec-Ontario boarder, plus Montreal.  East of this border, the highest proportion
immigrants is in Halifax, but this is still under half of the national average (Statistics Canada,
1997b).  Even Winnipeg, Oshawa, Ottawa-Hull, Thunder Bay, Regina, Saskatoon and Sudbury
have a smaller proportion of immigrants than the national average of 18.2 percent foreign born in
the 1996 census.  In these distributions, it is especially Toronto and Vancouver that stand out,
with 41 and 35 percent foreign born respectively by 1996.  In the Canadian-born population,
Montreal retains its historical position as the largest Canadian city, but the immigrant population
of Toronto is three times that of Montreal. In addition, immigrants to Quebec are highly
concentrated in Montreal, amounting to 88 percent of Quebec's foreign born in 1996. 
In terms of total numbers, the three metropolitan areas of Toronto, Montreal and
Vancouver stand out, with 60.2 percent of the foreign-born compared to 26.8 percent of the
Table 4. Regional Distribution of Canadian Born and Immigrants by Arrival Cohorts, Censuses
of 1971 to 1996, Canada 
1971  1981 1991 1996
Canadian born
Atlantic
Québec
Ontario
10.3
30.7
33.2
10.9
28.9
32.2
9.9
27.5
33.4
9.5
27.1
33.5
12
Prairies
Brit Col
16.5
9.3
17.8
10.3
17.7
11.1
17.7
11.8
Immigrants 1961-70
Atlantic
Québec
Ontario
Prairies
Brit Col
2.1
18.0
55.5
11.3
13.0
2.1
16.0
55.5
11.3
15.1
1.8
14.2
57.4
10.5
15.9
1.9
13.9
57.1
10.4
16.6
Immigrants 1971-80
Atlantic
Québec
Ontario
Prairies
Brit Col
---------------
2.4
14.1
51.6
15.1
16.8
1.9
13.6
52.5
14.3
17.6
1.9
13.3
52.5
13.7
18.5
Immigrants 1981-91
Atlantic
Québec
Ontario
Prairies
Brit Col
---------------
---------------
1.3
15.8
54.0
13.1
15.7
1.3
14.4
54.9
12.3
17.0
Immigrants 1991-96
Atlantic
Québec
Ontario
Prairies
Brit Col
---------------
---------------
---------------
1.1
14.5
54.2
9.3
20.8
Total --- --- --- 100.0
Note: Total includes the Territories
Sources:  Beaujot and Rappak, 1990: 113; 1991 Census: 93-316 Tables 3 and 6, 1996
Census: N03-0411.IVT 
Canadian-born population (Table 5). The concentration is even more uneven when considering
recent immigrants.  A fifth of the 1996 populations of Toronto and Vancouver consists of
immigrants who have arrived since 1981 (Statistics Canada, 1997b: 5).  Over the immigrant
arrival cohorts, Toronto and Vancouver have increased their share of immigrants, while this
share is stable for Montreal, it has declined slightly for the total of other metropolitan areas, and
significantly for the non-metropolitan areas.  Consequently, the non-metropolitan population
comprises 43.0 percent of the Canadian-born population but only 6.5 percent of immigrant
arrivals of the period 1991-96.
Table 5. Distribution of Canadian Born and Immigrants by Arrival Cohorts, by Metropolitan
Areas, Canada, 1991 and 1996 
CanBorn Before 61 1961-70 1971-80 1981-91 1991-96
-1991-
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Toronto
Montréal
Vancouver
Sub-total
Other CMA
Other
Total
10.2
11.3
4.8
26.3
28.0
45.6
100.0
25.1
9.5
8.4
43.0
30.3
26.6
100.0
35.4
12.8
9.8
58.0
26.0
16.0
100.0
36.5
11.7
12.6
60.8
25.8
13.4
100.0
39.4
14.0
12.9
66.3
24.5
9.2
100.0
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
-1996-
Toronto
Montréal
Vancouver
Sub-total
Other CMA
Other
Total
10.4
11.4
5.0
26.8
30.1
43.0
100.0
25.1
9.4
8.1
42.6
30.2
27.1
100.0
34.2
12.4
10.0
56.6
26.8
16.6
100.0
36.2
11.6
13.0
60.8
24.9
14.3
100.0
40.0
12.8
13.7
66.5
23.9
9.7
100.0
42.4
12.9
18.3
73.6
19.8
6.5
100.0
Notes: CMA: census metropolitan areas
In 1996 the Canadian born includes the non-permanent residents
Sources: special tabulations based on 1991 public use sample.
1996 Census: N03-0411IVT and Population by age group, sex and marital status.
More generally, the metropolitan destination of immigrants is pushing the urbanization
trend.  The metropolitan areas as a whole have been increasing through immigration but
declining as a result of net internal migration.  In a study of metropolitan areas of various sizes
over the period 1976-1996, Gilbert et al. (2001) find that the growth of the largest metropolitan
areas is largely due to immigration, while that of non-metropolitan regions is due mostly to
internal migration. Over the 25 metropolitan areas of the 1996 census, the net internal migration
of the 1991-96 period represents a net departure of 156,000 persons, while 971,000 immigrants
had arrived in the five years that preceded the census (Table 6).  Internal migration was positive
in ten of the metropolitan areas, but except in Victoria recent immigrants are more numerous
than net internal migrants.  In eight metropolitan areas the immigrant arrivals are insufficient to
compensate for the net departure by internal migration.  However, in the remaining seven cities
(Edmonton, Halifax, London, Montreal, Sherbrooke, St. Catharines-Niagara and Toronto) there
is a negative net internal migration of 167,485 persons but a net international arrival of 627,265
persons over the period 1991-96.  Migration statistics for 2000-2001 indicate that these patterns
have since continued. That is, there was positive net migration into the three largest metropolitan
areas, but the internal migration indicates more people leaving than arriving (Statistics Canada,
2002d: 6). Not only is immigration pushing the urbanization trend, but in most of the largest
cities it is helping to compensate for the net departure through internal migration.
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Table 6. Immigrants of the 1991-96 Period and Net International Migration of the Period 1991-
96, by Metropolitan Area, Canada 
Immigrants of
1991-96 Net Internal
Migration
Total CMA
Calgary
Chicoutimi-Jonquière
Edmonton
Halifax
Hamilton
Kitchener
London
Montréal
Oshawa
Ottawa-Hull
Québec
Regina
Saskatoon
Sherbrooke
St. Catharines-Niagara
St. John=s
Saint John
Sudbury
Thunder Bay
Toronto
Trois-Rivières
Vancouver
Victoria
Windsor
Winnipeg
971,040
33,775
285
27,270
4,850
17,940
12,600
11,770
134,535
3,785
38,040
5,175
2,675
3,555
2,095
5,715
895
245
745
945
441,030
470
189,660
6,250
10,655
16,080
-156,425
9,275
-4,060
-23,615
-3,730
820
1,480
-3,440
-47,880
13,005
1,695
1,670
-4,520
-3,960
-1,225
-190
-3,950
-1,520
-2,400
-3,585
-87,405
730
12,095
9,715
1,545
-16,975
Source: 1996 Census: N03-0411.IVT 
Statistics Canada, Daily, 14 April 1998
The 2001 census has highlighted four large urban regions which together comprised just
over half of Canada’s population: the extended Golden Horseshoe from Oshawa to Kitchener in
Southern Ontario with 6.7 million people or 22 percent of the country’s population, Montreal
and adjacent region with a population of 3.7 million or 12 percent of the country, British
Columbia’s lower mainland and southern Vancouver Island with 2.7 million people or 9 percent
of the country, and the Calgary-Edmonton corridor, with 2.2 million people and 7 percent of the
country. Compared to the total country which grew by 4 percent over the period 1996-2001,
these four regions grew by 7.6 percent. Those provinces that did not include one of these urban
regions either declined in population or increased by less than one percent in the five year
period.
Not only is the distribution of the immigrant population rather different from that of the
Canadian born, but the subsequent internal migration of the foreign born tends to accentuate
these differences, in favour of Ontario and British Columbia (Table 4). It is in the initial years
after arrival that immigrants are most mobile; after 15 years of residence, their mobility is less
than that of the Canadian-born population (Ram and Shin, 1999). It is from the Atlantic region as
well as Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Quebec that the foreign born are most likely to leave, while
they are least likely to leave Ontario (Edmonston, 1996). The provinces that receive
disproportionate numbers of immigrants are less likely to see their departures for other provinces
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(Bélanger, 1993; Edmonston, 2002). That is, there is no evidence of an increased dispersion of
immigrants over time (Edmonston, 1996).
Population distribution is thus different from other characteristics that distinguish
immigrants. On most characteristics, the impact of immigration in terms of the differences that
they represent, lessens over time (Beaujot, 1999).  For instance, their fertility and mortality
comes to resemble that of the Canadian born, as do their economic characteristics.  Even the
visibility of minorities lessens over time, as styles of dress and speech become more similar with
a longer length of residence.  However, on geographic distribution, where immigration
accentuates the uneven distribution of the population, the subsequent re-migration of immigrants
tends to accentuate the largest areas of initial destination. 
Given that immigrants are likely to settle mostly in metropolitan areas and to follow the
pathways established by earlier cohorts, immigration will probably continue to accentuate the
inequalities in Canada's regional population distribution.  While there are efficiencies associated
with more concentration of population, this also means that immigration cannot be seen as a
means of demographic redistribution toward areas that have smaller populations. In an article on
the social and political implications of recent immigration trends, Simmons (1997) expresses
concern that those provinces which do not include large metropolitan areas will see a decline in
their relative population share and associated political and economic correlates.
Socio-cultural composition
The main elements of socio-cultural composition to be considered are place of birth, visible
minority status and language. Generalizing about minorities in various countries, Lacroix (1991)
makes the interesting observation that all societies have minorities and need to balance
assimilation and the respect for differences.  The uniqueness of Canada does not come from the
presence of minorities and the dynamics of their integration, but from the fact that immigration
plays a predominant role in such questions.
Figure 2 illustrates the changing composition of the immigrant stream over the period
1946-2000. Until 1970 more than half of arrivals were from Europe. Since 1979 the Asian
component has been the largest. The proportion from Asia, Latin America, and Africa combined
increased from 8 percent in 1961 to 65 percent in 1980 and has since increased to about 80
percent of total arrivals.
The term visible minorities is increasingly used to refer to the population of non-
European origin. In view of employment equity programs, the visible minority population is
defined as persons who are neither white, caucasian nor aboriginal.  In effect, it is largely the
population that originates directly or indirectly from Asia, Latin America and Africa.
At the 1981 census, the visible minority population was estimated at 1,130,000 persons
(4.7 percent of the total population), of which 85 percent were of foreign birth (Samuel, 1987).  
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Figure 2. Place of Birth of Immigrants, 1946-2001, Canada 
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In 1991, this population numbered 2,715,000 or 9.7 percent of the total population.  Among
persons with visible minority status aged 15 and over in 1991, close to two thirds had arrived
since 1971, and 35 percent since 1981 (Kelly, 1995).  The 1996 census enumerated 3.2 million
persons with visible minority status, including slightly more than 30% of Toronto and
Vancouver, and 74 percent of the 1991-96 immigrants (Chard and Renaud, 1999). Based on
slightly lower mortality and slightly higher fertility than the national average, and with a
continuation of immigration trends, it is projected that the visible minority population would
increase to about seven million in 2016, or close to 20 percent of the Canadian population (Dai
and George, 1996). These projections are based on broad definitions to capture any element of
non-caucasian origin. In particular, all children born from mixed parentage including caucasian
and visible minorities are classified as visible minority. Thus the projections are based on strong
ethnic retention, while the very meaning of visible minority status may change considerably over
a twenty year period. It can be argued that Canada is becoming a multi-ethnic society where
‘pluralism’ rather than ‘visible minorities’ is the more appropriate term.
Turning to language, significant numbers do not know English nor French at the time of
arrival, but over time the majority come to associate with one or the other of the official
languages. At the time of arrival, 30 percent of immigrants of the 1969-77 period, and more than
40 percent of those of the 1978-2001 period did not know either of the official languages
(Thomas, 1992; Citizenship and Immigration, 2002).  In the 1991-96 cohort, only a quarter of
immigrants were using an official language at home in 1996, and more than ten percent knew
neither of these languages (Table 7).
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Table 7. Knowledge and Use of Official Languages, by Sex, for Canadian Born and Various
Immigrant Cohorts, Canada, 1996 
Know an official language
    Spoken at home               Not spoken at home
     Male             Female            Male           Female
Do not know an
official language
  Male      Female
Canadian born 97.1 97.2 2.5 2.4 0.4 0.4
Immigrants 55.1 54.7 39.6 36.7 5.3 8.6
Before 1951 83.1 84.3 15.9 13.9 1.0 1.9
1951-65 72.3 70.0 24.7 24.7 3.0 5.3
1966-75 69.1 68.0 27.6 25.7 3.3 6.3
1976-80 56.9 56.3 38.1 35.5 5.0 8.2
1981-85 47.5 47.6 46.1 40.9 6.4 11.5
1986-90 37.1 38.8 56.4 50.6 6.5 10.5
1991-1996 27.5 28.3 62.3 57.3 10.2 14.4
Source: Census of Canada, 1996. Public Use Microdata File of Individuals.
In order to highlight this tendency for immigrants to associate with the official languages,
the concept of "predominant language" combines the responses on language spoken at home and
knowledge of official languages.  Persons who speak English or French at home were assigned
this language as their predominant language.  Persons speaking "other" languages at home were
also assigned to English or French predominant language if they could speak "only" that
language among the official languages.  In effect, this measures which one among the official
languages is a given person's predominant language.  
Outside of Quebec, the results are simple: immigration contributes to the English
language, and there is less French among immigrants than in the Canadian-born population
(Table 8).  In Quebec, the foreign born are clearly less French (41.0 percent) than the Canadian-
born population (88.5 percent).  In spite of the minority status of English in Quebec, immigrant
cohorts before 1965 are more English than French.  For the cohorts arriving since 1980, about 45
percent are French predominant language, with 25 percent English, and the remaining 30 percent
cannot be classified in either language. Other research finds that French is stronger for younger
immigrants and for those who did not know English at the time of arrival (Veltman, 1988; Paillé,
1989).
Quebec also receives a greater proportion of immigrants who know neither of the official
languages, and persons of third languages retain these longer.  This longer retention is probably
related to the larger potential for ethnic separateness provided by French-English tensions in
Quebec.  In addition, as we have seen, immigration is concentrated in the one metropolitan area
of Montreal, and the city of Montreal in particular (Paillé, 1991).  This concentration presents a
difficulty for linguistic integration.  For instance, in given localities, the French mother tongue
children can be in a minority, even in French schools. It is found that, immigrant students in
French schools which have high concentration of non-French ethnic origin are less positively
oriented to learning French (McAndrew, et al., 2000).  On the other hand, immigrants of third 
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Table 8. Predominant Language for Canadian Born and Various Immigrant Cohorts, Quebec and
Rest of Canada, 1996 
Quebec
   English          French        Other
Rest of Canada
  English       French        Other
Canadian born 9.3 88.5 2.2 95.8 3.3 0.9
Immigrants 31.9 41.0 27.1 90.6 0.6 8.9
Before 1951 69.0 20.8 10.2 98.1 0.2 1.7
1951-65 42.9 32.3 24.8 95.0 0.3 4.7
1966-75 34.3 42.6 23.1 93.5 0.5 6.0
1976-80 23.1 49.1 27.7 90.5 0.5 9.0
1981-85 23.4 45.0 31.6 87.5 0.6 11.9
1986-90 24.7 43.5 31.7 87.5 0.5 11.9
1991-1996 26.3 43.7 30.0 83.8 0.7 15.4
Notes: The predominant language is determined on the bases of language spoken at home and
knowledge of official languages. Those who speak one national language at home are assigned
this predominant language. Those who do not speak English or French at home are assigned that
predominant language if they know only English or French among the official languages. The
‘other’ category comprises those who speak both English and French at home, plus those who
speak neither language at home and know both or neither of the official languages. 
Source: Census of Canada, 1996. Public Use Microdata File of Individuals.
languages are more oriented to French than are non-immigrants of either English or third
languages (Castonguay, 1992).
The general linguistic trends in Canada involve decreases in the official language
minorities, that is English in Quebec and French in the rest of Canada.  For the rest of Canada,
immigration contributes to the trend as there is less French among immigrants than in the native
born population.  In Quebec, immigration enhances the English minority because there is more
English among immigrants than in the native born, and a sizeable proportion of third language
migrants continue to transfer to the English language. The immigrants to Quebec who are most
likely to associate with the French language are those who were selected on the basis of prior
knowledge of French, and children who arrive early enough to be schooled in French.  
Immigration therefore plays an important role in Canada's changing linguistic
distribution.  Although the distribution by languages changes only slowly, immigration is the
main element producing an increase in the relative size of the English language in comparison to
the French language (Lachapelle, 1988a).  While language policy in Quebec has promoted a
greater association of immigrants to the French language, this is partly at the expense of
departures of English and other linguistic groups.  Therefore, it is at the expense of a lower total
weight of Quebec in the population of Canada.  Lachapelle (1988b) has put it well: it is hard to
envisage scenarios that would both sustain the weight of Quebec in the Canadian total and
increase the proportion French in Quebec.  The rest of Canada does not have such a problem:
more of its international arrivals are English to start with, other immigrants retain their languages
less, and almost all transfers favour English. 
Socio-economic status
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Immigration can also affect the characteristics of the population in terms of education, labour
force status and income. These are best analyzed in regard to entry cohorts, which are here also
separated by birthplace groups. 
On education, the relative advantage of immigrants compared to the Canadian born was
highest in the immediate post-war period, when the Canadian educational system was poorly
developed. Even for the 1961-69 arrivals, 23.1 percent of persons aged 25-64 had some
university education in 1971, compared to 10.5 percent of the Canadian population. 
Measured in terms of average years of education, Table 9 shows that immigrant men of
given immigration cohort and age groups always have more average education than their
Canadian born counterparts. However, for women the differences are smaller and there are some
comparisons, especially among women aged 45 and over for recent cohorts, where the Canadian-
born have more education. Among the immigrant cohorts since 1975 or 1980, those from Europe
and the United States typically have more education. For the older cohorts, the immigrants from
other than Europe and the United States typically have more average education..
In the 1986 census, labour force participation at given ages was higher for immigrants
than for the Canadian-born (Beaujot, 1991: 129). In the 1996 census, labour force participation is
now slightly higher for Canadian born than for immigrants (Table 10). There are significant
differences by immigration cohort, with participation typically higher than that of the Canadian
born for cohorts arriving before 1980 or 1985. For the cohorts arriving since 1986, all but one of
the ten-year age and sex groups has lower labour force participation than that of the Canadian-
born. Labour force participation is typically higher for immigrants born in Europe and the United
States, especially for men and for women arriving since 1980.
Table 11 shows two age-adjusted measures of average income.  Total income relates to
all persons who indicated a positive income in 1996.  Employment income is based on persons
aged 15-64 who worked full-time for at least 40 weeks in 1990.
In earlier censuses, immigrants as a whole were very close to the national average
(Beaujot et al., 1988). In the 1996 census, the averages for total immigrants  are 6 to 14 percent
below the Canadian born in average income. There are marked differences by arrival cohort and
place of origin.  Groups that arrived before 1975 largely have average incomes higher than that
of the Canadian-born population, while the more recent immigrant cohorts have a disadvantage. 
Another change takes place over these same cohorts: the average income of immigrants from
Europe and the United States moves from being less than to being more than that of immigrants
from other continents.  In the post-1976 cohorts there is a strong disadvantage for immigrants
who are not from Europe and the United States, that is who are largely visible minorities.  For
persons admitted in the period 1981-90, the disadvantage at the time of the 1996 census is in the
range of  25 to 35 percent for men and 15 to 25 percent for women. For arrivals in the last five
years before the census, those from Europe and the United States have a disadvantage of some
20 to 35 percent, while those form other continents have a disadvantage of 40 to 50 percent. 
Similar conclusions are reached by looking at the proportions with low income status or 
who are unemployed. For the 1980s, Hou and Picot (2002) find that the propensities of low
income were quite similar for the immigrants in comparison to the Canadian-born, but by 1999
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Table 9. Average Years of Education by ten-year Age Group and Sex, separately for Canadian Born, Foreign Born, by Arrival Cohort,
and Place of Birth of Foreign Born, Canada, 1996
Female
     15-24           25-34       35-44       45-54        55-64         Total
Male
    15-24            25-34       35-44        45-54       55-64        Total 
Canadian born 12.5 13.7 13.1 12.3 10.9 12.7 12.0 13.4 13.1 12.5 10.8 12.6
Immigrants 12.8 13.7 13.2 12.5 10.7 12.6 12.5 13.9 13.6 13.3 11.9 13.1
Before 1951 12.9 11.1 12.1 13.4 11.8 12.6
1951-65 14.3 13.5 12.0 10.5 11.6 13.9 13.8 12.8 11.3 12.3
1966-75 14.8 14.2 12.9 12.8 11.5 12.9 14.0 13.8 13.4 13.4 12.7 13.4
1976-80 13.7 14.1 12.9 12.9 10.9 13.1 13.4 13.9 13.3 13.6 12.3 13.4
1981-85 12.8 13.3 13.3 12.6 10.1 12.8 12.5 13.8 13.7 13.9 12.5 13.3
1986-90 12.5 13.2 13.3 12.6 9.7 12.8 12.2 13.5 13.7 13.7 11.7 13.2
1991-1994 12.3 13.7 13.4 12.2 9.5 12.8 12.1 14.4 13.9 13.3 11.3 13.2
Europe & U.S. 12.9 14.0 13.3 13.5 10.6 12.4 12.6 13.7 13.5 13.0 11.5 12.8
Before 1951 12.9 11.1 12.1 13.4 11.9 12.7
1951-65 14.2 13.4 11.9 10.3 11.5 14.6 13.7 12.8 11.1 12.2
1966-75 14.5 13.9 12.3 12.3 10.9 12.4 13.9 15.0 12.8 12.8 12.0 12.8
1976-80 13.6 14.1 13.1 13.1 11.1 13.1 13.3 13.9 13.4 13.4 12.3 13.4
1981-85 12.8 13.7 14.2 13.6 12.0 13.6 12.4 13.4 14.1 14.5 13.0 13.7
1986-90 12.1 13.6 13.8 13.2 10.9 13.2 11.9 13.3 13.7 13.7 11.9 13.2
1991-1994 12.5 14.8 14.4 13.9 12.0 14.1 12.3 13.6 14.4 14.4 13.1 13.9
Other 12.7 13.5 13.1 12.4 10.8 12.8 12.5 13.8 13.7 13.8 12.7 13.4
Before 1951 12.8 10.7 12.0 15.0 10.7 11.4
1951-65 14.9 14.2 13.1 12.0 12.9 14.1 14.3 13.7 12.8 13.4
1966-75 15.2 14.8 13.6 13.5 12.4 13.6 14.2 14.3 14.1 14.3 13.9 14.3
1976-80 13.8 14.1 12.9 12.7 10.8 13.0 13.6 13.9 13.3 13.7 12.4 13.5
1981-85 12.8 13.2 12.7 11.9 9.4 12.5 12.5 13.5 13.5 13.3 12.0 13.2
1986-90 12.6 13.1 13.1 12.4 9.4 12.6 12.3 13.3 13.7 13.7 11.7 13.2
1991-1994 12.2 13.3 13.1 11.8 9.1 12.5 12.0 13.8 13.8 13.1 11.1 13
Source: Census of Canada, 1996. Public Use Microdata File of Individuals.
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Table 10. Labor Force Participation Rate by ten-year Age Group and Sex, separately for Canadian Born, Foreign Born, by Arrival
Cohort, and Place of Birth of Foreign Born, Canada, 1996
Female
  15-24       25-34        35-44       45-54        55-64        Total
Male
 15-24         25-34       35-44        45-54        55-64       Total 
Canadian born 61.3 79.4 80.3 74.0 39.0 70.0 64.2 92.4 92.5 89.0 59.8 81.9
Immigrants 51.6 72.9 75.7 74.5 42.3 66.2 53.6 88.6 90.7 90.0 67.6 81.5
Before 1951 77.7 42.4 61.2 89.0 64.3 76.6
1951-65 82.1 82.9 73.7 40.0 60.0 93.7 94.1 91.6 64.3 79.4
1966-75 81.7 81.1 81.5 78.4 51.5 74.6 79.6 92.4 92.5 91.5 76.5 88.3
1976-80 65.8 78.7 77.1 77.3 51.8 73.6 71.7 91.3 92.7 91.3 75.5 87.3
1981-85 54.8 74.5 76.0 76.7 42.7 69.5 57.7 90.1 91.6 91.1 69.5 83.1
1986-90 47.3 69.7 73.0 69.9 34.5 64.0 47.8 87.3 89.6 86.0 64.5 78.3
1991-1994 42.3 66.1 65.1 56.5 24.1 56.4 44.1 83.8 84.6 79.6 43.2 71.7
Europe & U.S. 61.2 77.6 79.3 75.1 41.6 67.1 63.0 92.5 93.4 91.7 67.9 83.9
Before 1951 77.8 43.1 61.8 89.0 64.5 77.2
1951-65 81.6 83.1 73.3 38.7 59.3 93.4 93.9 91.7 64.0 79.4
1966-75 83.1 81.3 80.3 75.6 46.5 72.0 80.6 93.3 93.1 91.6 74.7 88.1
1976-80 70.7 81.8 76.8 76.5 51.7 74.2 72.8 93.9 94.3 92.9 77.3 88.6
1981-85 59.2 77.2 78.6 80.0 56.6 73.6 63.3 93.1 92.9 93.3 79.6 85.6
1986-90 51.1 73.4 76.2 80.5 42.6 69.6 53.8 92.6 94.0 90.6 73.9 84.5
1991-1994 53.3 70.9 73.5 69.1 33.0 66.5 54.5 89.0 91.8 93.1 78.5 83.1
Other 48.2 70.4 73.1 73.8 43.8 65.4 50.0 86.5 88.6 87.6 66.8 79.3
Before 1951 75.0 30.0 50.0 87.5 61.9 66.0
1951-65 84.8 81.5 77.6 50.4 65.9 94.7 95.8 90.5 66.6 80.0
1966-75 80.3 80.8 82.8 81.9 59.6 78.2 78.4 91.0 91.8 91.5 79.2 88.6
1976-80 62.8 77.0 77.2 78.0 51.9 73.3 71.0 90.0 91.8 90.2 74.1 86.6
1981-85 52.3 73.5 74.6 74.4 38.0 67.4 54.4 89.2 91.0 89.3 61.3 81.8
1986-90 46.1 68.3 71.7 67.0 32.7 62.0 45.8 85.6 87.7 84.4 62.7 76.2
1991-1994 40.3 64.7 62.8 53.6 22.8 53.9 42.0 82.3 82.6 76.4 38.2 68.9
Source: Census of Canada, 1996. Public Use Microdata File of Individuals.
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Table 11. Indexes of Total Income and Employment Income, by Sex, Place of Birth, and Arrival
Cohorts, Adjusted for Age, Canada, 1996 
Total Income
        Men                Women
Employment Income
       Men                Women
Canadian born 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Immigrants 0.92 0.94 0.86 0.87
Before 1951 1.14 1.15 1.02 1.03
1951-65 1.08 1.09 1.03 0.99
1966-75 1.03 1.10 0.97 1.01
1976-80 0.92 0.96 0.87 0.90
1981-85 0.86 0.89 0.83 0.84
1986-90 0.70 0.75 0.70 0.74
1991-1994 0.56 0.59 0.57 0.59
Europe & U.S. 1.04 1.01 0.95 0.91
Before 1951 1.13 1.15 1.02 1.04
1951-65 1.08 1.07 1.02 0.97
1966-75 1.04 1.09 0.97 0.99
1976-80 1.06 1.00 0.98 0.90
1981-85 1.03 1.01 0.95 0.89
1986-90 0.89 0.83 0.83 0.75
1991-1994 0.81 0.69 0.77 0.64
Other 0.78 0.86 0.77 0.83
Before 1951 1.49 1.14 -- --
1951-65 1.17 1.22 1.11 1.11
1966-75 1.00 1.12 0.96 1.05
1976-80 0.84 0.94 0.81 0.90
1981-85 0.76 0.85 0.75 0.82
1986-90 0.64 0.72 0.65 0.73
1991-1994 0.51 0.56 0.51 0.58
Notes: 
-- fewer than 50 cases
Adjustments for age (using ten-year age group of Canadian men and women as the standards),
ages 15+ are used for total income and ages 15-64 for employment income. Employment income
(wages and salaries plus self-employed income) is measured for those working full-time at least
40 weeks in 1995. Only persons with positive total income are used to calculate income.
Source: Census of Canada, 1996. Public Use Microdata File of Individuals.
the rates of low income were 33 percent higher in the foreign born. Immigrants who had been in
Canada less than five years already had low income levels that were 1.29 times the rate of the
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Canadian-born in 1981, but this increased to 2.18 times in 1989 and 2.93 times in 1999.
Following male unemployment over the period 1982 to 1993, McDonald and Worswick (1997)
find higher unemployment for the recent immigrants who had arrived in the period 1971-80, but
not for those of the 1956-70 arrival cohorts. Especially during periods of recession, like the early
1980s and early 1990s, unemployment was significantly higher for the 1971-80 arrival cohorts.
These same differences applied when considering only persons with university education.
The comparison of the 1961 and 1971 censuses had shown a very encouraging outcome
for post-war immigrants (the 1946-60 cohort).  In the majority of age-sex groups, the average
income in 1961 was lower than that of the Canadian born, but by 1971 these groups had largely
exceeded the averages of Canadian born counterparts (Richmond and Kalbach, 1980).  Few
similar transitions occurred over the 1971 to 1991 censuses (Beaujot and Rappak, 1990: 139;
Beaujot, 1999: 111).  In the vast majority of comparisons, a given immigrant cohort was either
above or below the average of the Canadian-born population at each census.  The transitions that
did occur were as follows: the 1961-69 cohort had lower average incomes than the Canadian
born in 1971 but exceeded this average in 1981, and women of the 1970-74 cohort made a
similar transition by the time of the 1986 censuses.
Table 11 shows no further transitions in the 1996 census, for persons arriving since 1975. 
It would appear that the immigrants of cohorts since 1975 may not reach the average income of
persons born in Canada, in spite of their educational advantage.  The situation is more positive
for immigrants from Europe and the United States until 1985, whose average total income
exceeds that of the Canadian born. For the majority of recent immigrants, that is those who are
not from Europe and the United States, and who would largely be visible minorities, the four
most recent cohorts show serious disadvantages.  On the other hand, in the cohorts that preceded
1965, these immigrants from the "other continents" have an average income that is typically
superior to the average for immigrants from Europe and the United States.
Further analyses based on the 1991 census indicate the importance of region of residence
and socio-cultural characteristics.  In particular, the disadvantage of recent cohorts, especially
those of non-European origin, applies more to residents of metropolitan areas (Beaujot, 1997). 
Except for the most recent arrivals, the minority of immigrants who were living in non-
metropolitan areas had average incomes that compared favourably to the Canadian-born in the
same areas.  Other results show that the advantages of immigrants of European origin applies to
the British but not to the Italian.  At the same time, the disadvantage of non-European
immigrants does not apply to Chinese arrivals of the 1961-80 period.  Also, immigrants who
speak one of the national languages at home have average levels of income that compare
favourably to that of the Canadian born.
Various analyses have highlighted the economic disadvantages of immigrants of the early
1990s, in spite of the increase in the relative size of the economic class and their high levels of
education. Between 1990 and 2000, the proportion arriving as skilled workers increased while
family and refugee classes declined. The principal applicants of the economic class comprised 23
percent of immigrants arriving in 2000, but 43 percent of the immigrants who were intending to
join the labour force (Ruddick, 2001). Among the principal applicants of the economic class, the
vast majority have university education and know at least one of the official languages. One year
after landing, the employment earnings of these principal applicants, were above the Canadian
average for landing years 1980 to 1988, but below this average for 1989-1997. Despite the high
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average education of the 1991-96 immigration cohort, at the time of the 1996 census, they were
less likely to be employed, had relatively high unemployment rates, and they had a significant
risks of low-income status (Thompson, 2002).  
Other analyses of the 1986, 1991 and 1996 censuses show a trend toward lower rates of
employment and earnings relative to the Canadian-born population. Looking at successive
cohorts of immigrants, Reitz (2001) finds in particular that the increased education of the
Canadian-born population has reduced the relative advantage of immigrants. In addition, over
time, the increased returns to education are stronger for Canadian-born than for immigrants. In
particular, the proportion of immigrants aged 20-64 who are employed has declined, especially
for men who have been in Canada for 0-5 years (idem., p. 32). Among persons who are
employed, at ages 20-64, immigrant men who had been in Canada less than 25 years, and women
who had been in Canada less than 15 years, had average 1995 incomes that were below that of
the Canadian-born of the corresponding gender (idem., p. 35). In addition, from census to census
the trends are downward, with the more recent censuses showing immigrants with given length
of residence having lower relative income. A decomposition analysis indicates that, for most
comparisons, a significant proportion of the increased disadvantage of more recent cohorts can
be attributed to (1) change in the relative immigrant education level, and (2) change in the
relative value of immigrant education in the labour market.  
There are also differences across origin groups; for instance, for men with 6-10 years of
residence in Canada, white immigrants in the 1996 census had a 5.7 percent disadvantage,
compared to 33.0 percent for black immigrants, 22.6 for Chinese, 23.0 for South Asian, and 29.1
for Filipino. The average disadvantages for women in the same category of length of residence
was 13.7 percent for white, 19.6 for black, 5.9 for Chinese, 22.6 for South Asian and 8.5 for
Filipino immigrants (idem., p. 36).
Reitz (2001) discusses three possible sources of changes in immigrant relative socio-
economic status: changes in the skills that immigrants bring, changes in the treatment received
by immigrants within the labour market, and changes in the structure of the labour market itself.
Compared to the 1960s, the skills of immigrants have increasingly been defined by academic
degrees rather than technical training. Racial discrimination could be the reason for the increased
discounting of immigrant skills, but this explanation seems inadequate since white immigrants
are also affected, although to a lesser degree. The changed structure of the labour market toward
a service economy may undermine the value of educational credentials obtained abroad, and may
accentuate the negatives associated with lack of “Canadian experience” and Canadian references. 
In summary, while the average level of education of immigrants has been increasing, this
increase has not been as strong as that of the younger cohorts of internal entrants to the labour
force. The cohort differences by labour force participation and average income clearly show that
the strong negative differential at the time of arrival is reduced over time (Badets and Howatson-
Leo, 1999).  However, especially with regard to the average income of immigrants who are not
from Europe and the United States, the disadvantage of the more recent cohorts are not being
reduced as quickly.  Counter to earlier cohorts, it is unlikely that more recent immigrant cohorts
will come to match the average incomes of the Canadian born, in spite of having more average
years of education. 
Nonetheless, two positive observations can be made. One is that immigrants who finish
their education in Canada receive stronger economic value for this education (De Silva, 1997,
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1996; Hum and Simpson, 1999). Second, while immigrants themselves often have economic
disadvantages, the second generation has shown very strong levels of economic adaptation.
Based on data for persons aged 25-64 in 1994, Boyd and Grieco (1998) find that second
generation men and women have positive outcomes in terms of education and occupational
achievement.
An interpretive context
On both empirical and theoretical grounds, it is harder to make generalizations about migration
than about the other demographic processes of mortality and fertility. Empirically, the main
generalization about international migration to Canada seems to be that if immigration is going
up, it will eventually come down, and if immigration is going down it will eventually come back
up. Another empirical generalization seems to be that higher levels of immigration are linked
with higher levels of emigration (Beaujot and Rappak, 1989; Michalowski, 1991). When there is
more movement, it will occur in all directions, including onward moves to subsequent
destinations, or returns to the place of origin. Looking at emigration from Canada, especially to
the United States, and immigration to Canada, Zhao et al. (2000) entitle their study “Knowledge
workers on the move.” In effect, another generalization is that persons with higher socio-
economic status are more prone to migrate, because they have more opportunities. There is also
more proneness to move in young adult ages, or at times of life course transitions.
While it is very difficult to theorize about migration because there are many potential
factors at stake, it is useful to start with what might be called a natural tendency not to move. At
the international level, it is noteworthy that 97.7 percent of the world population is living in their
country of birth (Simmons, 2002). Staying represents integration with family and friends
(Goldscheider, 1971). Questions of integration are consistent with the observation that people
who have moved once are more likely to move again, and that return migration is a common
phenomenon. The importance of social integration is also consistent with chain migration. It
could further be proposed that life course and social factors are more important in determining
whether or not people move, while economic factors are more important in choosing the place of
destination. People move especially at stages of the life course that involve disruptions, such as
leaving home, finishing school, finding a job, starting or terminating a relationship, or
retirement. Whether or not people move would also be a function of how comfortable or
integrated they are in a given location. Once people are prone to move, economic factors, or
more broadly the push and pull factors, determine the place of destination. When people are
settled, especially when there is a two-income family with children, a higher salary at a different
location will not be attractive. But when looking for a first job, a higher salary may prompt
people to move, especially if they see other opportunities at the place of destination.
Thus, at the micro level, we theorize that social and life-course questions associated with
extent of integration in family and community are more responsible for whether or not people
move, and economic questions are more responsible for the choice of destination when people do
migrate.  At the macro level, there would be movement toward locations that have greater
potential to integrate, both economic and social. Besides these push and pull factors, there are
barriers as represented by information, communication, transportation and distance.
  For international migration, the factors to consider include the opportunities for social
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and economic integration at places of origin and destination, along with links and barriers
between countries, including policy barriers. Clearly, levels of immigration are a function of
things happening within Canada and others happening outside of the country, along with the
links and barriers across countries, both in the short and longer terms (Simmons, 2001). 
In The Age of Migration, Castles and Millar (1998) argue that international migration is a
constant in human history and that population movements accompany demographic growth,
technological change, as well as political conflict and warfare. In terms of population growth, the
second phase of the demographic transition clearly involves much growth, with associated out-
migration pressure. Castles and Millar also link the high levels of movement to the greater
inequality across countries, and to transnational networks and cultural interchange.
In their theoretical synthesis, Massey et al. (1994) propose that globalization creates both
mobile populations following on various economic displacements, and demand for labour in the
largest cities.  With communication links, family and other networks, migratory exchanges are
perpetuated between places of origin and destination (Boyd, 1989; Fawcett, 1989).
Freer trade brings various types of linkages between countries, including those of
migration.  In North America, the free trade agreements would enhance development in Mexico.
This development would increase emigration pressure in the short run, and reduce this pressure
in the long run ( Zlotnik,1996).  However, given the historical links between Mexico and the
United States, this migration pressure is expected to have less effect on Canada.
Beyond North America, the demographic transition, especially the population pressures
associated with the phase of rapid population growth, produces emigration pressure. Given this
out-migration pressure, the medium term will show no shortage of a potential pool of people
who want to come to Canada, and these outside pressures are probably increasing (Golini, 1996;
United Nations, 1995). Development itself, which is clearly associated with the demographic
transition, brings various displacements as economic change undermines various traditional
forms of livelihood, especially in rural areas. Emigration pressure started in Northern Europe
over a century ago, later it was from Eastern Europe, and in the post-war period from Southern
Europe. As these populations entered the third phase of the demographic transition, along with
stable urban economies with high standards of living, the out migration pressure was lessened.
The development, displacement, and out migration pressure from Third World countries is now
dominant in world patterns.  
Turning from the things happening outside, to Canada as a receiving country, the
conclusions regarding determinants of immigration have largely been based on broad factors of
political economy.  In view of the geographic size of the country, and the need to control the
resources that were present, immigration has often been seen as necessary if not essential
(Sullivan, 1992).  While arguments concerning family reunification and humanitarian attitudes to
refugees have their importance, the economic argument has tended to be dominant in Canada's
openness to immigration (Employment and Immigration, 1989).
While the factors that have been analysed from within Canada have been especially
economic and demographic, a case can be made that they should be seen in social and political
terms.  Immigration is favourable to economic growth, but it is not a major factor (Economic
Council of Canada, 1991; Green and Green, 1999).  Immigration can sustain demographic
growth, but it can only slightly reduce the pace of population aging.  
In particular, the fact that unemployment is one of the better predictors of immigration
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can probably be mostly interpreted in social and political terms (Veugelers and Klassen, 1994a,
1994b; Foot, 1994; Simmons, 1994).  In spite of the research to the effect that immigration
contributes little to unemployment, there is a social and political tendency to be less favourable
to immigration when economic conditions are more difficult (Palmer, 1996, 1999).  That is,
when the social mood is more favourable, there is a tendency to see immigration positively,
especially in terms of increasing the cultural richness of Canada, contact with a broader
pluralistic world, and being generous to the disadvantaged.  When the climate is less favourable,
there is a sense that we should first look after ourselves, or a felt need to retrench, to reduce the
pace of change.  Some theorists have seen natural tendencies toward opening and closing over
intervals of time (Klapp, 1978).
Politically, the orientation has often been to follow the social climate, and thus not to
deviate excessively from public opinion.  Nonetheless, it is interesting to observe that the
Conservative government continued its orientation of “planned controlled growth” through the
recession of the early 1990s.  The party was on record as having judged it a mistake on the part
of the Liberal government to have reduced immigration in the recession of the early 1980s.  In
addition, in the early 1990s the governing party was at an all-time low in political opinion,
having alienated various groups from the West who wanted more say in government, and from
Quebec seeking a renewed constitution.  It may be that the party sought the support of interest
groups surrounding immigration, both multi-cultural groups and business interests, as a means to
make public opinion inroads in these difficult political times (Foot, 1994).
If this interpretation is correct, to the effect that receptivity to immigration is mostly a
function of social and political climate, then predictions of changes in trends are particularly
difficult. We can be quite confident that the medium term will show continued out-migration
pressure from various countries of emigration, and globalization brings more information and
exchange, but the receptivity of countries of immigration is more difficult to predict.  
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